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a b s t r a c t
We present results from the second pilot project in the international Verification Grand
Challenge: a formally verified specification of a POSIX-compliant file store using the Z/Eves
theoremprover. The project’s overall objective is to build a verified file store for space-flight
missions. Our specification of the file store is based on Morgan and Sufrin’s specification
of the UNIX filing system; the proof and its mechanisation in Z/Eves are novel. We show
how our work contributes towards building a verified software repository: a set of general
theories, proof techniques, and experiments reusable across different domains.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The growing size and complexity of systems is increasing the pressure for reliable software. In high-integrity and safety-
critical areas, reliability is a requirement enforced by regulators, but it is difficult to verify correctness and ascertain reliability
through software testing or imprecise development processes. Formal methods are software development techniques that
allow an accurate characterisation of the problem domain that is firmly based on mathematics; by applying standard
mathematical analyses, these methods can be used to prove the correctness of systems.
The idea of applying mathematical modelling and analysis in software development processes is not new. Although it
requires different expertise and development processes, when compared with traditional development life-cycles, it has
been used successfully in industrial applications, such as electronic banking [29], and is widely accepted academically with
several decades of experience. With tools backed by mature theory, formal methods are becoming more effective, and their
use is easier to justify, not as an academic or legal requirement, but as a business case. Despite the initial extra effort, formal
methods can give increased reliability, accountability, and precision, and they can save money. Also, as tool maturity rises,
levels of expertise from the user tend to decrease, hence de-skilling the process and making it cheaper to industrialise.
These recent advances in theory and tool support have inspired industrial and academic researchers to join up in an
international Grand Challenge in Verified Software [12], and have created a sense of urgency in making its objectives a
reality. Work has started with the creation of a Verified Software Repository (VSR) with two principal aims: (i) verified
software components; and (ii) industrial-scale verification experiments with considerable theoretical significance and tool-
support impact [7].
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1904 434753; fax: +44 1904 432708.
E-mail addresses: leo@cs.york.ac.uk (L. Freitas), jim@cs.york.ac.uk (J. Woodcock), zhengfu@itee.uq.edu.au (Z. Fu).
1 Zheng is now at the University of Queensland.
0167-6423/$ – see front matter© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.scico.2008.08.001
L. Freitas et al. / Science of Computer Programming 74 (2009) 238–257 239
In this paper, we present the mechanisation of a file store, together with a proof of refinement down to a hashmap
representation that is close to the one from Java. We explore the intermediate levels of refinement reached during various
refinement proof attempts, before the actual refinement proofwas concluded. Refinement proofs are like iterated refutations
in the sense of Lakatos [18] and Popper [27]. We propose future work for the other parts of the UNIX filing system, such as
directory and file naming, as well as a further exercise in linking the Z modelling results down to a proof-of-concept Java
implementation using the Java Modelling Language (JML) [1]. We do not suggest that Java is a useful language in which to
implement a file system, but rather that we can easily derive a prototype implementationwithwhich to experiment further.
We particularly emphasise the mechanisation issues encountered while specifying the various parts of the specification.
We think this is important since keeping them in mind is the difference between getting to a dead end or successfully
completing later proofs. Obviously, different tools will have different detailed mechanisation issues, so we describe general
issues related to Z, such as type inference lemmas related to maximal typechecking. On the other hand, we also add
discussion on specific mechanisation issues for our theorem prover of choice: Z/Eves [30,23,31]. The choice is based on its
ease of use, long previous experience, and most importantly for the students involved, its gentle learning curve. Although
development on Z/Eves has ceased for a while, we are currently discussing with the tool builder an open source version
of the tool to be (hopefully) hosted at York. The front-end to the tool has been improved with an experimental plugin for
Z/Eves within the Community Z Tools2 framework.
Related work. The first VSR pilot project experiment took place during 2006: the successful mechanisation of a sanitised
version of the first ITSEC Level 6 high-integrity Mondex smart-card banking application [29]. In that experiment, seven
groups used different theories and tools tomechanise theMondex refinement and its verification [38].We have successfully
reused some of the theories that we developed in the Z/Eves team. We expect to benefit in the future from some related
work: an implementation in occam of a ‘‘POSIX-aware’’ small operating system [10].
In the next section, we briefly recall the rationale for choosing a good pilot project, and in particular the reasons for
choosing the POSIX interface for file stores. In Section 3, we present the scope of the work, together with important
design decisions and a revised abstract specification. Next, Section 4 presents the concrete implementation for which
the refinement is proved using Z/Eves in Section 5. We briefly summarise the calculated preconditions for both abstract
and concrete operations in Section 6. After that, Section 7 shows mechanisation issues and statistics, which serve as both
basic theories for other experiments, and benchmarks for different theories and tools. Finally, Section 8 summaries our
achievements and discusses future work.
2. What makes a pilot project?
In [16], Joshi and Holzmann suggest a pilot project for the grand challenge. They characterise, motivate, and justify an
interesting choice for formal verification as a mini-challenge. They propose that the grand challenge should be broken into
smaller projects with considerable relevance according to the following features: ‘‘(a) each must be of sufficient complexity
that traditional methods, such as testing and code reviews, are inadequate to establish correctness’’; ‘‘(b) each must be of
sufficient simplicity that specification, design and verification could be completed by a dedicated team in a relatively short
time, say two to three years’’; ‘‘and (c) each must be of sufficient importance that successful completion would have an
impact beyond the verification community’’, and to both academia and industry.
At a workshop at SRI [35], the POSIX file-store interface of the Linux Kernel [17] was suggested as a candidate pilot
project. In particular, the suggestion involved a small subset of POSIX suitable for flash-memory hardware with strict fault-
tolerant requirements to be used by forthcoming NASA missions. Due to the nature of the environment this small subset
would run in, two important robustness requirements for fault tolerance were later agreed [8]: (i) no corruption in the
presence of unexpected power loss; and (ii) recovery from faults specific to flash hardware (i.e., bad blocks, read errors, bit
corruption due to radiation, etc.). In recovery from power loss in particular, they require the file system to be reset-reliable
in the following sense: if an operation Op is in progress at the time of a power loss, then on reboot, the file-system state will
be as if Op either has successfully completed or has never started.
3. POSIX file system
The choice for the POSIX file-system interface is interesting for various reasons: (i) it is a clean,well-defined, and standard
interface that has been stable for many years; (ii) underlying data structures and algorithms are also well understood; (iii)
although a small part of an operating system, it is complex enough in terms of reliability guarantees, such as unexpected
power loss, concurrent access, or data corruption; and (iv) modern information technology is massively dependent on
reliable and secure/safe information availability. All these reasons go beyond the verification community interest, as well as
the intended initial use on forthcoming NASA missions, as developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL).
An initial subset of POSIX has been chosen for the pilot project. There is no support for: (a) file permissions; (b) hard or
symbolic-links; and (c) entities other than traditional files and directories (e.g., no pipes, sockets, etc.). Adding support for
2 http://czt.sourceforge.net.
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(a) is not difficult and may be done later, whereas support for (b) and (c) is more difficult and might be beyond the scope of
the challenge. In any case, popular flash-memory file systems, such as YAFFS2 [39], also do not support these features since
they are not typically needed for the embedded environment in which flash devices usually reside.
We choose to focus on basic functionality for files and directories, starting from the former. This includes APIs singled out
by JPL, such as create, open, close, read, write, truncate, ftruncate, stat, fstat, mkdir, rmdir,
rename, opendir, readdir, rewinddir, closedir, etc., where documentation is found in [24]. In addition, we
have also considered system-wide operations, such as format, mount, and unmount. This means that we are not initially
concerned with encryption, directory listing, regular expressions, and other utility operations, since they are usually built
on the top of this basic functionality. Also, JPL opted for the very conservative guarantee about concurrent behaviour that
the result of executing concurrent operations is equivalent to executing them in some serial order. This of course comes at
some performance cost, which is being traded for simplicity. This simplificationmay be too strict a requirement for a general
embedded file system, so this issue remains open in the context of the grand challenge.
These APIs were formally specified in 1995 in [25], using the Z notation [34] during the development of requirements
for the POSIX standard itself [15] (also in 1995). An abstract specification capturing these requirements in Z was created
from the set of informal requirements to show how they were sometimes ambiguous or contradictory. This Z specification
served as a guideline for the actual version of the POSIX standard [17] (from February 1998). In fact, the Z specification from
1995 [25] was inspired by an earlier, even more abstract formal definition of UNIX file systems given in [22]. And that is
our starting point for the functional requirements as well. As the POSIX standardisation body chose the Z notation, and we
are quite familiar with this notation, we follow suit and start the work in Z as well. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily a
requirement, and another formalism such as B [33] or Circus [36] could be used as well.
In our approach to this pilot project proposal, we follow an architecture set by Intel in [5], which explains how to separate
and then orthogonally combine different aspects, such as hardware, fault tolerance, and functional requirements for file
systems. This architecture is particularly useful for flash-hardware devices. It is also amenable for generalisation to other
types of hardware, as well as other fault-tolerance concerns. As a scientific (rather than commercial) challenge, this is
important in order to move away from NASA’s specific hardware and fault-tolerant requirements.
3.1. Abstract specification and operations
In [22], an abstract specification describing a UNIX filing system is given by defining a few data structures and operations
of files and file storage using the Z notation [34]. It is divided into three parts comprising: (i) basic file creation and data
manipulation; (ii) file descriptors (or channels) used to access created files and their data (i.e., a file access table); and (iii)
directories and links. Although it does not completely model POSIX behaviour, such as error codes or file permissions,
it serves as a good starting point for developing our target subset mentioned above. In this paper, we describe the
mechanisation and refinement proof of (i) using the Z/Eves theorem prover [30]. We assume general knowledge of Z and
refinement [37].
We parsed, typechecked, and added automation lemmas for the formal material in [22] related to part (i) above. Thanks
to theorem proving, in this process alone, we found (and fixed) some inconsistencies, which are discussed below. Firstly,
we introduce some auxiliary types for FILE as a sequence of bytes and file store as a function from abstract file identifiers to
FILE.
[FID]
BYTE == 0 . . 255
FILE == seq BYTE
FSTORE == FID 7→ FILE
The abstract specification was a simple function from file identifiers to a sequence of bytes, where initialisation just sets this
function as the empty set.
FS =̂ [ fs : FSTORE ]
InitFS =̂ [ FS ′ | fs′ = ∅ ]
Before we progress to the state operations, it is worth mentioning the need for mechanisation, even for such a simple data
type as FSTORE. The reason is subtle: Z typechecking is maximal in order to keep it automatic, but extra information about
structured data types is usually still needed. Fortunately, it is usually possible to predict what data type inference lemmas
are needed. These type inference lemmas are always type weakening lemmas: they allow the prover to infer that a stronger
type, say N1, implies a weaker type, say Z. Depending on the nature of the specification, intermediate weakening lemmas
are needed (e.g., x ∈ N1 ⇒ x ∈ N). For instance, the following theorems are needed in order to considerably increase the
automation levels of later proofs. Otherwise, if such theorems are not added, one ends up with repetitive (and sometimes
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rather complex) type inference proof obligations to discharge in order to conclude a proof. Soon enough these impediments
become a hindrance. We add some of them below.
theorem rule lByteSeqMaxType
∀ x : seq (0 . . 255) • x ∈ seq Z
theorem rule lFSMaxType
∀ fs : FID 7→ FILE • fs ∈ P (FID× P (Z× Z))
theorem rule lFiniteFSResultSeqMaxType
∀ fs : FID 7 7→ FILE; fid : FID | fid ∈ dom fs •
fs fid ∈ seq (0 . . 255)
The first theorem establishes that a sequence of BYTEs is also a sequence of integers, whichmeans thatwe can use arithmetic
operations on the contents of these sequences. Similarly, we add themaximal type for FSTORE, which is useful whenever it is
involved in more basic toolkit laws, such as set operations or function application. The last theorem establishes yet another
type inference lemma for the resulting type of FSTORE when applied to some valid element of its domain. Together with
the first theorem, which weakens this resulting type further, most of the operations involving functional application for
FSTORE over elements of its domain are automatically discharged. A final remark is regarding the usage and ability of these
theorems. A rule is a special usage keyword that specifies the theorem as a tautology for the underlying proof engine.
That is, when adding a theorem like N ⊆ Z as a rule, Z/Eves actually encodes it as (N ⊆ Z) ⇔ true. This affects specific
rewriting tactics of the proof engine, hence it determines the level of granularity such lemmas will have during proofs. By
default, rule’s ability is enabled, and the proof engine will always apply such a proof rule whenever needed. If we want
to keep definitions simpler and avoid expansion to the lowest levels, then we define a disabled rule, in which case the
prover will never automatically use it, and it will be applied only by direct user interaction. Usage and ability are specific
aspects of Z/Eves.
The auxiliary functions from [22] were redefined next as operator templates, taking into account mechanisation issues.
These operator templates are defined as infix functions that bind as tightly as set intersection (S ∩ T ) and stronger than
set difference (S \ T ); that is, S shift T \ R = (S shift T ) \ R. In Z/Eves this is stated with the syntax keyword and generic
definition as follows:
syntax shift infun4 \shift
syntax after infun4 \after
zero : N→ FILE
shift : FILE × N→ (N 7→ BYTE)
after : FILE × N→ FILE
∀ n : N • zero n = (λ i : 1 . . n • 0)
∀ f : FILE; offs : N •
f after offs = (offs+ 1 . . #f )  f ∧
f shift offs = (1 . . offs)−C (zero offs a f )
The zero function returns a FILE of size nwith ‘‘null’’ (zero) bytes, whereas ( after ) returns the subfile after the given offset,
and ( shift ) returns a file shifted by the given offset.
Two system-wide operations modify the state by creating an empty file with a given fid?, which overrides in fs′ any
previous file for fid? in fs, provided it is fresh
Create
∆FS; fid? : FID
fid? /∈ dom fs
fs′ = fs⊕ { fid? 7→ 〈〉 }
or by removing from the file store a known fid? , which implicitly requires fs to be non-empty.
Destroy
∆FS; fid? : FID
fid? ∈ dom fs ∧ fs′ = { fid? } −C fs
In the original definition [22] promotion was used, where extra auxiliary variables were needed for file updates. These
variableswere then hidden in order to keep the state components as defined in FS. As the operations are rather simple, and as
promotion complicates mechanisation of refinement proofs, we decided to avoid it and give equivalent simpler definitions.
Also, we added the restriction that fid? are fresh upon creation for efficiency (i.e., avoids reusing ids).
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For conciseness, we define a signature for the next two operations. It contains two inputs: a known file identifier within
the file store; and the offset within the file where the following operations are to be performed.
FSOp
∆FS; fid? : FID; offs? : N
fid? ∈ dom fs
To read from a file, nothing changes (ΞFS), and the resulting file (d!) is extracted from the given offset (offs?) up to the
required length (len?), where the ( after ) operator returns the offset subfile associated with the fid? input.
Read
FSOp; ΞFS; len? : N; d! : FILE
d! = (1 . . len?) C ((fs fid?) after offs?)
To write into a file at a given offset (offs?), the original file is (possibly) padded with zeros, and the given data (d?) is added
at the shifted offset position.
Write
FSOp; d? : FILE
fs′ = fs⊕ { (fid?, (zero offs?⊕
(fs fid?)⊕ (d? shift offs?))) }
This concludes the abstract operations.
To clarify theway itworks,we present an example. For instance, it is given a file f (containing the string ‘‘Hello’’ in decimal
UNICODEs), some data d? (containing the string ‘‘ World!’’, again in decimal UNICODEs), a length 12 (# ‘‘Hello World!’’),
and an offset 5 (# ‘‘Hello’’). Then the result of writing ‘‘ World!’’ followed by reading it from offset 5
Write(5, 〈95, 87, 111, 114, 108, 100, 33〉) o9 Read(5, 12)
can be deduced using the definitions above as
offs? = 5 ∧ len? = 12 ∧
f =〈72, 101, 108, 108, 111〉 ∧
d? =〈95, 87, 111, 114, 108, 100, 33〉
⇒ [Write : f ′ = (zero offs?⊕ f )⊕ (d? shift offs?)]
f ′ = (〈0, 0, 0, 0, 0〉 ⊕ 〈72, 101, 108, 108, 111〉)⊕
(〈95, 87, 111, 114, 108, 100, 33〉 shift 5)
= 〈72, 101, 108, 108, 111, 95, . . . , 33〉
⇒ [Read : d! = (1 . . len?) C (f after offs?)]
d! = (1 . . 12) C (〈72, 101, . . . , 33〉 after 5)
= (1 . . 12) C (〈95, 87, . . . , 100, 33〉)
=〈95, 87, 111, 114, 108, 100, 33〉
which leads to d! = ‘‘ World!’’ from the UNICODEs. We use integers, rather than characters, for convenience because the
characters are not defined.
3.2. Finiteness considerations
In [22, p. 76], further considerations on actual implementations are given, mainly regarding finiteness of file stores and
limits on file sizes. We also take into account the finiteness of file systems and file storage here. We add limits to both file
sizes and number of files. The former is given globally as it relates to physical characteristics of devices holding files (e.g.,
number of addressable blocks or number of bytes per block [32]), whereas the latter is given locally, as it relates to the
capacity of each file store.
MaxFileSize : N1
Then, we redefine bounded FILE and FS accordingly.
FFILE == { f : FILE | # f ≤ MaxFileSize }
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FFS
fs : FID 7 7→ FFILE; MaxNoFiles : N1
# fs ≤ MaxNoFiles
InitFFS
FFS ′; maxf ? : N1
fs′ = ∅ ∧ MaxNoFiles′ = maxf ?
The use of finite function ( 7 7→) is important, otherwise the state would be inconsistent (i.e., there will be nomodel that could
represent it) because cardinality (#) requires a finite set. This shows the profitable outcomes of theorem proving, since the
original bounded specification was inconsistent [22, p. 76] (i.e., it used 7→). Also, as f ∈ FILE is defined as a sequence it is
inheritably finite, hence # f is well defined in FFILE.
Initialisation is similarly trivial, but now contains a restriction on the storage capacity of the file store. The existential
proof for the state initialisation is trivial, since we just need to provide a strictly positive value forMaxNoFiles′, as the value
for fs′ is given.
theorem InitialSSExistence
∀maxf ? : N1 • ∃ FFS ′ • InitFFS
Other issues, such as hardware device capacity orminimumbytes per file, are not considered here; they are addressed in [4].
The required changes in the abstract operations to take into account the finiteness of the file store and the limit in file
sizes are also trivial. One just needs to add an extra invariant saying the corresponding data structures belong to the new
(finitely) restricted types. For instance, the finite Create operation is defined below as
FCreate
∆FFS; fid? : FID
# fs < MaxNoFiles
MaxNoFiles′ = MaxNoFiles
fs′ = fs⊕ { fid? 7→ 〈〉 }
For all other operations, we just need to change to FFS and add thatMaxNoFiles′ = MaxNoFiles. We omit them here to save
space.
4. Concrete specification
Wewant to refine this abstract specification to a concrete implementation using Z forward simulation [37, Ch. 16–17] [6],
so that it is efficient and close to a general programming language, and hence amenable to prototyping. A possible candidate
to represent the file store would be an array or vector, which most languages support.
Javawas chosen as a target language for the experimental prototype because of the JavaModelling Language (JML) toolset,
which gives extra formal supportwith pre and postconditions, class and loop invariants, and so on [1]. These annotations not
only formally document the Java code, but also enable static checking, run-time assertion checking, and other verification
tasks to be performed on the target code, such as loop invariant detection [13,2]. For the concrete data type, we use Java
HashMaps, as they give constant-time performance for most operations, including search and insertion. HashMap has also
already been used successfully elsewhere in the efficient encoding of flash-file systems [20]. The benefits of these choices are
three-fold: (i) an efficient (and well-known) implementation structure for our abstract file store amenable for prototyping;
(ii) a new Z (HashMap) data type that can be useful for different modelling purposes; and (iii) an up-lift of a JML description
that we can use to prove some useful properties. For example, theorem proving has been used [14] to show that Java Set
implementation (version 1.3) is not guarded against Russell’s paradox [28]. In this paper, we present the benefits from (i).
The complete refinement proof for (i) is available in [11,8,40]. Formore details on (ii) and (iii) one can consult [19]. The choice
for hashing mechanisms to represent flash-file systems have also been shown to be more efficient in practical (industrial)
applications [21].
A Java HashMap represents Object keys mapped to Object values, where the key’s int hashCode()method is used
for uniquely indexing the (key, value) pairs into the underlying array-like data structure. The key hash code integer is
normalised to a natural number via a hashing function (hf ), taking into account the map capacity. The squiggly arrow here
just (informally) represents the effect of map.put over the HashMap.
i.e., map.put(o1, v1)  
(hf (o1.hashCode(), capacity) 7→ v1)
In this model, clashes can happen either when there are more elements than room available, in which case the map could
expand, or when badly programmed (i.e., duplicated) hash codes compromise the hashing function. In both cases, Java’s
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robust solution is to have a linked list at the points of clash, so that in the worst case one gets a ‘‘spiked’’ map, where many
(clashed) entries grow outwards as linked lists. So, in the case of a clash with another value
o1 6= o2 ∧
hf (o1.hashCode(), capacity)
= hf (o2.hashCode(), capacity)
an update would become
map.put(o2, v2)  
(hf (o2.hashCode(), capacity) 7→ 〈v1, v2〉)
Thus, at the hash code index generated by a given object a HashMap entry (i.e., linked list of key/value pairs associated
with a hash code index generated by the key) is added. Each entry forms an injective list of object keys mapped to their
corresponding values, which in the concrete case are finite FILEs
‘‘HashMap == hf hashCode seq FFILE ’’
Then, we need tomodel in Z the Java hashing and clashingmechanisms described above, as FFILE is already concrete enough
a choice for mapped values.
Themap has two parameters allowing trade-off between the performance of different operations: an initial capacity and
a load factor. The capacity is the initial length of the array of entries, whereas the load factormeasures how full themapmay
get before its capacity is automatically increased. This design provides constant-time performance for basic query and insert
operations, assuming the hash function disperses the elements properly. Iteration over the map requires time proportional
to the capacity (the initial array size), plus the number of actual key–value pairs. When the number of map entries exceeds
the product of these parameters, the map is rehashed to allow room for further entries. In this way, these two parameters
can be used to trade off performance between get/put and iteration operations.
The hashing function is trivially defined using integer division remainder, bearing in mind the (positive) capacity of the
involved map.
hf : Z× N→ N
∀ hck : Z; n : N • hf (hck, n) =
if (n = 0) then
if (hck ≥ 0) then hck else −hck
else




This provides separation of concerns, so that different implementations can provide more efficient hashing strategies
without changing the clashing mechanism and other mapping operations. Although the map’s capacity could be strictly
positive (N1), Java allows it to be zero, in which case an internal (strictly positive power of 2) default value is used. This
affects the efficiency of the hash distribution. As this does not affect our formalisation, we keep hf simpler.
In what follows, we present the concrete specification for the abstract file operations described above. In this refinement
process, we went through some series of smaller steps (and various versions of the specification). In here we present only
the final concrete specification, as space restrictions enable us only to portray frames of a longer story. In spite of this fact,
we tried to depict the various evolutionary stages we went through (see Section 5).
4.1. Auxiliary data types
Firstly, we define auxiliary structures that will be the basis of a file system API using Java HashMaps in Z.We also abstract
Java hashCode() implementations, which generate a hash code key. For that we axiomatically define an injection from the
corresponding hashCode() algorithm of the object instance used to generate the unique hashing value.
[OID]
algo : OID Z
Having algo as an injection allows us to further refine our specification when we need to be more specific on how hash
code keys are generated (i.e., JML pre and postconditions for Java int hashCode() implementations), since we can always
go back to the object identifier from which the hash code has been generated. As the injection is total, there is always an
algorithm to go from an OID to its hashCode(), provided OID is non-empty, which is true for Java whenever at least one
object is instantiated.
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This total injection is in resonance with the JML specification of hashCode(), which is just true for both pre and
postconditions on aΞ object state (i.e., a side-effect-free method). Although JML suggests (as a specification comment only)
an extra invariant that the postcondition should actually be
// @ ensures (\forall Object o;
// this.equals(o) ==>
// this.hashCode() == o.hashCode());
it is not taken forward for technical reasons (undisclosed, to our knowledge). This commented invariant is in accordance
with the Java (informal) documentation for the relationship between the hashCode() and equals(Object o)methods.
That is, structurally equivalent objects must have the same hash code. The reverse is not required, but is desirable since
it improves the performance of HashMap implementations. Ideal implementations of these two methods are available for
the unaware programmer, such as the EqualsBuilder and HashCodeBuilder classes of the Jakarta Commons Apache
library,3 which provide adequate solutions as suggested in [3]. More details on this can be found in [19]. We model the Z
HashCode operation using the algo injection above following the same interface as Java.
HashCode
oid? : OID ; hck! : Z
hck! = algo oid?
Map keys are not immutable and may suffer from side effects, in which case the behaviour of the map is not specified.
Thus, as Object instances are given as map keys, care must be taken if their structure (the result of their equalsmethod)
should change whilst within the map, as this might affect the result of hashCode(), hence their positions within the map.
Also, a direct consequence is that maps themselves should never be keys, and if maps are values within maps, the equals
and hashCodemethods of the (outermost) map itself would no longer be well defined.
Secondly, we model the HashMap entries considering the clashing mechanism as
Entry == { s : iseq (OID× FFILE) |
∀ o : OID ; f 1, f 2 : FFILE |
o 7→ f 1 ∈ ran s ∧ o 7→ f 2 ∈ ran s • f 1 = f 2 }
That is, instead of seq FFILE as the mapped values from OID, we have an injective sequence (iseq) of (unique) pairs of
object instances to fixed size files. The sequence represents ordering for clashes, where the injectivity (uniqueness) is an
optimisation for storage. It also serves as a soundness invariant for the hashCode() of entries, whenever maps are values
in othermaps. At last, to avoid an object instance key being associatedwith different files, pairswithin the injective sequence
(i.e., (o, f ) ∈ ran s) are functional. This avoids file links/aliasing at the physical level, and also facilitates the retrieve relation
from abstract (FID, FFILE) pairs from the file store (fs) into concrete (OID, FFILE) pairs from HashMap entries. Thismodel also
captures the efficiency concerns for Java HashMap lifted from its JML specification.
This functionality property between Entry pairs also ensures the important invariant that the same OID can never be
mapped to more than one file within each map Entry. This does not avoid the same OID from appearing in different entries,
though. This is a deliberate flexibility allowed within the Java implementation because hashCode() calls may return
different values for the same object instance at different times. This surprising behaviour is due to the intricate relationship
between hashCode() and equals(Object o). It happens whenever structural equality influences (or implies) hash code
implementations, that is, whenever both equals(Object o) and hashcode() implementations are based on the object
state (i.e., object attributes). Therefore, we would obviously need to have immutable keys for file stores. This level of detail
can only be specifiedwhenever amore concretemodel for the object instance (OID) and its hash code implementation (algo)
are given. For now, since algo is injective, either hash code keys are immutable and side-effect free, or their implementation
is such that (potential) side effects are taken into account to maintain immutability.
The JML hashCode() specification allows what they call ‘‘benevolent side effects’’, meaning those side effects
unobservable by external clients, such as caching schemes. It is also not quite clear what the motivations were for not
enforcing a side-effect-free hashCode(). Even if one agrees that there is a case for ‘‘benevolent side effects’’ (e.g., changing
requirements, or optimisation), nothing is given to enforce the (informal) Java invariant between hashCode and equals.
Perhaps, this choice is based on some undisclosed (JML) technicality, or is still under development. In [19, p. 263], we provide
a (more conservative) alternative specification that is side-effect free. It followed from the injective solution presented above
with algo.
Told this way round, the story seems more like a fairy tale: a purposeful data structure that magically captures the
necessary requirements. In fact, thanks to the scrutiny of theorem proving, we reached an elegant and adequate solution
amenable for mechanisation (see details in Section 7). Unfortunately, due to space restrictions, we can only narrate here the
tale’s happy ending, despite its many gloomy moments.
3 See jakarta.apache.org/commons.
246 L. Freitas et al. / Science of Computer Programming 74 (2009) 238–257
4.2. Concrete state
Finally, the concrete HashMap file-store state is given as
HMFS
hm : N 7 7→ Entry
idx, size : N; capacity, loadfactor : N1
dom hm = 0 . . capacity− 1
size ≤ capacity ∗ loadfactor
idx ∈ dom hm
∀ o : OID ; i : N | i ∈ dom hm •
i = hf (algo o, capacity)
It maps hash code indexes generated by a hashing function (hf ) into entries, where all such indexes are valid. That is,
they come from the result of the hashing function (hf ), which uses the object instance (o) hash code keys (hashCode())
algorithm (algo) result modulo the initial capacity of the map. This establishes the link between hash code indexes within
the map (i ∈ dom hm), and object instances (o) whose hashCode() algorithm (algo) we are interested in. Also, idx defines
the current allocation position mapping operations require. This is useful as a ‘‘working pointer’’ within the map to which
operations can refer.
As in the abstract version, state initialisation is trivial, where known indexes are initialised with empty entries, which in
Java reflects the instantiation of Entry objects.
InitHMFS
HMFS ′; c?, l? : N1
capacity′ = c? ∧ loadfactor ′ = l?
size′ = idx′ = 0
∀ i : dom hm′ • hm′ i = 〈 〉
Although the Java documentation for HashMap allows (yet does not recommend) zero capacity, both the JML specification
and the Java implementations circumvent this weak requirement by insisting on strictly positive capacity, whenever the
given capacity is negative (or zero). We follow suit, hence c? ∈ N1.
It turns out that the idx pointer is extremely important in facilitating later proofs of HMFS operations. The price to pay is
that the existential proof for HFMS initialisation (InitHFMS) is non-trivial (i.e., hm can never be empty as idx ∈ dom hm).
theorem tInitHMFSExistence
∀ c?, l? : N1 • ∃HMFS ′ • InitHMFS
Still, that is simple enough, since we can always map some index to a map with garbage (or empty) entries, such as
hm′ = {0 7→ 〈〉}
We do not need to specify state finalisation.
One interesting issue here is the fact we have interface refinement of state initialisation. That is, the abstract (finite)
initialisation (InitFFS) expects one parameter stating the storage capacity of the file store, whereas the concrete initialisation
(InitHMFS) expects two parameters for the storage capacity and load factor for rehashing. According to the rules in [6, Ch. 5],
we need to provide a retrieve relation for the state initialisation input interface, and to prove a correctness theorem about
how both state initialisations are related. The retrieve relation for the state initialisation input is given below.
RInInit =̂ [maxf ?, c?, l? : N1 | maxf ? = (c? ∗ l?) ]
It establishes that the storage capacity of the abstract file store (i.e., the maximum number of possible files) is the bound
given to the concrete hash map size (i.e., size ≤ c? ∗ l?). The correctness theorem for interface refinement between both
state initialisation inputs is given as
theorem tInitHMFSInitFFSInputRefIntf
∀ c?, l? : N1 • ∃maxf ? : N1 • RInInit
and is trivially true. A similar interface refinement theorem and retrieve are needed for the concrete operations, since they
have a different interface from the abstract version. They are presented below (see Section 5.4).
4.3. Concrete operations
As all operations we define here share some characteristics, we define a general mapping operation schema next.





loadfactor ′ = loadfactor
The map load balancing parameters cannot change, and the index currently being modified is within capacity. Also, with
HashCode inclusion, we extract the hash code key (hck!) from an object identity (oid?) (i.e., hashCode() result), which is
used by the hashing function (hf ) in mapping operations. Thus, the interface for all mapping operations will contain at least
one input (oid? ∈ OID) and one output (hck! ∈ Z).
Furthermore, to ensure that the resulting index (idx′) remains within capacity for the concrete operations, we prove the
next theorem about this hashing function.
theorem rule lHFWithinCapacity
∀ z : Z; n : N | ¬ n = 0 • hf (z, n) < n
That is, whenever the capacity is not zero, the hashing index result is always within capacity.
After that, we define each abstract operation for the hashmap implementation. To create a file, an element will be added
into the map, hence it must be able to increase size, where the current index is the result of the hashing function on the
given object identity (oid?).
CreateFile
MapOp
∀ i : N | i ∈ dom hm • oid? /∈ dom (ran (hm i))
size < capacity ∗ loadfactor
idx′ = hf ((algo oid?), capacity)
hm′ = hm⊕ { (idx′, ( (hm idx′) a 〈 (oid?, 〈 〉) 〉 )) }
size′ = size+ 1
The effect is to update the map entry at the given index with an empty file, which resembles what the (abstract) Create
operation does. As oid? is nowhere in the original map (oid? /∈ dom (ran (hm i)), for all i ∈ dom hm ), update due to file
creation can never create a clash and hence no risk of duplicated empty mappings within an entry appears. This invariant is
important because Entry elements are injective sequences.
For removing a file associated with a given key from the map, we needed an extra operator template over sequences ().
syntax  infun3 \nfilter
[X]
 : seq X × P X → seq X
〈〈disabled rule dNFilter 〉〉
∀ s : seq X; S : P X • s  S = s  (X \ S)
We call it sequence anti-filtering, which is related to range anti-restriction ( −B ) as sequence filtering (  ) is to range
restriction ( B ). The name  is internally used by Z/Eves to refer to the operator declaration, which expects a sequence
s and a set S in order to filter s with the complementary elements of the general type X . That is, it filters from the range of
s all elements in X but not in S. In order to keep the levels of automation high for this new definition, it is important that
we relate it with other definitions of the Z mathematical toolkit for which more automation is provided. To achieve this, it
suffices to prove the following lemma.
theorem rule lRanNFilter [X]
∀ s : seq X; S : P X • ran (s  S) = (ran s) \ S
It is again given as a rule, but this time it is enabled, hence  is blown away by the prover automatically. The lemma
defines the relationship between sequence anti-filtering and set difference. If we can forget about the sequence indexes
(ran s), sequence anti-filtering is just like set difference (or range anti-restriction, −B). Note also that the theorem does not
refer to the generic type X . This is important because X is usually maximal (i.e., only uses basic set combinators like power
set (P) and cross product (×)), and performing set difference with the actual (non-maximal) type is troublesome. This is a
general issue in theorem proving in Z. That issue on maximal types is due to the choice of fully automatic typechecking.
Now we can specify file removal from HashMap entries. Like the abstract Destroy, to remove a file, we need to know a
mapped object instance that encodes the hash code key at the current index (oid? ∈ dom (ran (hm idx)) ), and no change to
the current index is made. This implicitly means the map cannot be empty, hence decreasing the size by one is allowed.
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RemoveFile
MapOp
oid? ∈ dom (ran (hm idx))
idx′ = idx ∧ size′ = size− 1
hm′ = hm⊕ { (idx,
( (hm idx)  ({ oid? } C ran (hm idx)) )) }
For the map update we need to remove from the hm all (possibly clashed) references from oid? at the current index (idx).
For that we need to update the elements of the correct Entry (hm idx) by removing (i.e., anti-filtering) the pairs containing
oid?. That is, ran (hm idx) returns all the entry pairs, which are going to be filtered according to oid?. This gives all the entry
elements referring to oid?, which are then those to be removed from themap at hm idx. The final result is to update the map
at that index with the new entry where all pairs mentioning oid? have been removed.
The other two data operations change neither the current index, nor the map size. They have an added offset to the
interface from which to seek through the selected file that is related to the oid? that must be known into the HashMap at
the current index.
MapDataOp
MapOp; offs? : N
oid? ∈ dom (ran (hm idx))
idx′ = idx ∧ size′ = size
That is, hm idx returns an injective sequence of entry pairs at the current index. From this sequence, we extract using ran
the resulting (OID, FFILE) pairs, which are functional. At last, the chosen object instance (oid?) from which to calculate the
hash code key is the one to be projected within the available pairs using dom. As the additional input in the interface is the
same as the abstract, it does not need to be considered for interface refinement.
Here we can explain one of the gloomy moments mentioned above, which are often experienced whilst doing proofs.
First, note the stronger (hidden) invariant that ran (hm idx) ∈ OID 7 7→ FFILE. Originally, Entry did not have this side-condition
restriction (i.e., entry pairs are functional), but it became clearer whilst proving the forward simulation refinement of the
next two operations. In fairness, a JML invariant for HashMap had already (cryptically) hinted this as
/*@ axiom (\forall Map m; (\forall Object k,v,vv;
* (m.contains(k,v) &&
* m.contains(k,vv)) ==> v == vv)); @*/
This alludes to how the complex map structuring with entries from the implementation resembles the simple functional
link between FIDs and files from the abstract specification.
The concrete file writing and reading operations are performed similarly to the abstract one, provided the appropriate
projections within the HashMap are made. Again, the extra input/output variables in the interface of these two operations
are the same as in the abstract version, hence no interface refinement is needed for them.
Writing data (d?) into a file (f ′) associatedwith an object instance (oid?) at the given offset (offs?) is just like the (abstract)
Write operation above: padding the original file (f ) with zeros, and then overriding the new data (d?) on the shifted file. The
projection for the old file (f ) associated with oid? is extracted by the (OID× FFILE) pairs (p = ran e) from the map Entry at
the current index (e = hm idx). At last, only one pair (p′ oid? = f ′) from an Entry in the final map (e′ = hm′ idx) is updated,
since the pairs are equivalent when not considering oid? (i.e., { oid? } −C p′ = { oid? } −C p). For the sake of higher automation
levels, we rewrite this update as (oid?, f ′) ∈ p′ instead of p′ oid? = f ′. As the pairs in p′ are functional, the invariant is
indirectly preserved via type enforcement for p′.
WriteData OLD
MapDataOp; d? : FFILE
∃ e, e′ : Entry; p, p′ : OID 7→ FFILE; f , f ′ : FFILE
| e = hm idx ∧ e′ = hm′ idx ∧ p = ran e ∧
p′ = ran e′ ∧ f = p oid? ∧
{ oid? } −C p′ = { oid? } −C p •
f ′ = (zero offs?⊕ f )⊕ (d? shift offs?)
∧ (oid?, f ′) ∈ p′
Although this definition captures the right projection within the map and performs the right file update, it was not as
adequate as it could have been for mechanisation. One easy way to see the reason is to think about the precondition
proof for this operation. All after state variables have equations, except hm′, which is updated through the right projection
p′ oid? = f ′ (i.e., ran (hm′ idx)) oid? = f ′). That means during the precondition proof, which essentially is the simplification
of the existential quantification of all after state and output variables in the presence of before state and input variables,
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we need to explicitly provide an instance of hm′ for the existential quantifier. The trouble is that providing this instance to
carry on with the proof is quite hard. Not surprisingly, the forward simulation proof rules for this version ofWriteData OLD
are quite hard for similar reasons. Thus, instead of specifyingWriteData by pinpointing the right projection within hm′, we
decided to give a definition that performs the same update, yet provides an equation for hm′ in order to overcome the proof
problems just mentioned. It is given below.
WriteData
MapDataOp; d? : FFILE
∃ f , f ′ : FFILE | f = (ran (hm idx)) oid? ∧
f ′ = zero offs?⊕ f ⊕ (d? shift offs?) •
hm′ = hm⊕ { (idx, ((hm idx)⊕
(λ i : { j : N | (j, (oid?, f )) ∈ hm idx }
• (oid?, f ′)) )) }
As before forWriteData OLD, we project the original file (f ) out of themap (hm) and specify thewrite update to be performed
in f ′, where the existential quantifier is used just as syntactic sugar (i.e., it can be directly simplified using the one-point
rule [37, p. 48]) to avoid longer equations, as the simplification below of the quantifier inWriteData shows
hm′ = hm⊕ { (idx, ((hm idx)⊕
(λ i : { j : N | (j, (oid?, (ran (hm idx)) oid?)) ∈ hm idx }
• (oid?, (zero offs?⊕
((ran (hm idx)) oid?)⊕ (d? shift offs?)))) )) }
The equation for the map update (hm′) can be interpreted as follows. At the right index (idx) where the object instance is
oid? ∈ dom (ran (hm idx)), we update the Entry (hm idx) with the given object instance and new file ((oid?, f ′)). The trouble
is that since Entry is a sequence, we must find the right index within that sequence to perform the update. To do that, we
override the sequence with the pair (oid?, f ′) at the right sequence index (j) within the entry where the original file was
((i, (oid?, f )) ∈ hm idx). Since the Entry (hm idx) is an injective sequence, this λ-expression collapses to the singleton set
{ (i, (oid?, f ′)) }. To ensure that is the case, we have actually proved the following theorem.
theorem rule lHMIdxISeqIsPFun
∀ hm : N 7 7→ Entry; idx : N | idx ∈ dom hm
∧ (x, y) ∈ hm idx • (hm idx) x = y
It guarantees that the following equivalence holds
{ j : N | (j, (oid?, f )) ∈ hm idx } =
{ j : dom (hm idx) | (hm idx) j = (oid?, f ) }
The use of a λ-expression instead of an equivalent like
(λ i : { j : N | (j, (oid?, f )) ∈ hm idx } • (oid?, f ′))
= { i : dom (hm idx) | (hm idx) i = (oid?, f ) • (i, (oid?, f ′)) } (1)
This is again due to a mechanisation issue: whenever applying relational overriding (r = f ⊕ g) to a function (f ), in order
to keep the result (r) a function, g must also be a function, as the following Z toolkit theorem [31, p. 42] shows.
theorem rule overrideInPfun [X, Y ]
∀ A : P X; B : P Y •
∀ f , g : A 7→ B • f ⊕ g ∈ A 7→ B
In our case, since hm idx ∈ iseq(OID×FFILE) is a function, the following proof obligation on themaximal types of the function
in consideration would appear for our choice of g .
{ i : dom (hm idx) | (hm idx) i = (oid?, f ) •
(i, (oid?, f ′)) } ∈ Z 7→ (OID× P (Z× Z))
Now it is possible to understand why an apparently more complicated λ-expression (1) is a better choice: they are always
partial functions already, as the following Z toolkit theorem [31, p. 53] shows.
theorem rule lambdaConstFnIsPfun [X, Y ]
∀D : P X; y : Y • (λ x : D • y) ∈ X 7→ Y
Once more, we do not think these issues are a peculiarity of the tool of choice, but a consequence of the maximal
typechecking in Z, and the shape that the mathematical toolkit has been defined (i.e., ⊕ definition). On the other hand,
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some tool-specific issues do occur. For instance, note that the shape of the lambdaConstFnIsPfun law dictates the shape
of our λ-expression (1), since a equivalent definition like
(λ i : N | (i, (oid?, f )) ∈ hm idx • (oid?, f ′)) (2)
would not work, hence the same proof obligation on partial functions would apply for this version (2). Although such proof
obligations are not necessarily difficult to prove (yet sometimes they might be), the bigger the specification becomes, the
more of them one gets. Obviously this situation needs to be addressed as much as possible, and as early as possible, if we
are to take seriously the mechanisation of industrial-scale specifications.
Let us now define the last operation, which reads data (d!) from a valid file (f ) associated with the given object instance
(oid?) without changing themap (hm′ = hm). It is just like the (abstract) Read operation above: extract the requested length
(len?) from the subfile given by the ( after ) operator at the correct offset (offs?) requested, provided the precise projected
pair is chosen (p = ran (hm idx)).
ReadData
MapDataOp; len? : N; d! : FFILE
hm′ = hm
∃ p : OID 7→ FFILE; f : FFILE |
p = ran (hm idx) ∧ f = p oid? •
d! = (1 . . len?) C (f after offs?)
Alternatively, we could have defined these operations with extra auxiliary variables inMapDataOp, then have them hidden
within both operations adequately. The choice for existential predicates with equations for all quantified variables was
due to better automation levels, since the one-point rule can be applied directly. We also think that, when the structural
resemblance after projecting from the concrete data structures is adequately explained, the relationship with the abstract
operations becomes clear.
5. Layered refinement steps
As usual with forward simulation in Z, throughout the various stages one encounters a series of impediments, which
appear whilst attempting to establish refinement. These failed proofs usually provide deeper insight into the problem, so
that it can be finely tailored towards the final version. In total, there were around 60 (increasingly improved) versions of the
specification,where 40of those had to dowith refinement proofs. These versionswere related to varied issues: proof strategy
adjustment, improved automation lemmas, and most importantly, invariant and property updates due to new insight. Also,
as most of the initial proof work was undertaken by an MSc. student (Fu Zheng) who had no previous knowledge of Z or
theorem proving, many versions were also related to increased experience with the prover and further discussions leading
to more suitable definitions. These achievements show how powerful Z/Eves can be. The tool more than once has shown
its capability in de-skilling the theorem proving process for naive attempts at conjectures, and, at the same time, provides
a robust framework for more complex theorems. The refinement can be distilled into a series of smaller steps, which we
briefly summarise below.
5.1. Non-deterministic storage refinement
Starting from the abstract finite mapping between file identifier and files with finite size, as defined by FFS, we added a
clash mechanism, where the position within the mapping is completely non-deterministic.
SFS =̂ [ sfs : seq (FID 7 7→ FILE) ]
That is, we leave unspecified how one could acquire the right index within the sequence file store (SFS), where to add a new
pair. Note that sfs is a sequence of functions (i.e., a sequence of sets of pairs that are functional). In other words, we use the
sequence index to store various parts of the file-store function, where such an index is non-deterministically chosen. This is
the way we introduce a non-deterministic clashing mechanism. The four operations are them defined in terms of this new
data type. In this context, the following retrieve suffices to establish refinement.
SR =̂ [ FS; SFS | sfs partition fs ]
That is, the collective result of the files mapped through the various elements of the sfs sequence forms a partition over the
original abstract mapping. In Z, a partition represents a disjoint set of sets that encompass the whole partitioned type, as
defined by the Z toolkit operators [31, p. 80] below
syntax disjoint prerel \disjoint
syntax partition inrel \partition
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[I, X]
disjoint : P (I 7→ P X)
partition : (I 7→ P X)↔ P X
〈〈disabled rule disjointDef 〉〉
∀ S : I 7→ P X • disjoint S ⇔
(∀ i, j : dom S | ¬ i = j • S(i) ∩ S(j) = { })
〈〈 rule partitionDef 〉〉
∀ S : I 7→ P X; T : P X •
S partition T ⇔ disjoint S ∧⋃ (ran S) = T
In our case, the range of sfs represents the set of functions (FID 7→ FILE) to partition, where the abstract fs represents the
whole space of mappings we are interested into. This way, we have that entries may (non-deterministically) clash and end
up within different mappings within the sequence entries, such that the summation of all entries results in the original
sequence. This step goes towards distributed file storage, as well as more efficient searching and updating operations over
the state representing the file store.
5.2. Hashing function refinement
At this stage, we have added both clashing and hashing functionalities towards our concrete file store as a Java HashMap.
These two characteristics are important for implementation and efficiency concerns. This concrete data type is the one given
in HMFS above, where Entry and hf take into account clashing and hashing, respectively.
The uniqueness provided by the hashing function hf resolves the non-deterministic choicewithin the sequence from SFS,
whereas the injective sequence within Entry resolves potential remaining clashes due to storage capacity or bad hash code
algorithms. Remember that our hash function is just integer remainder of the hash code result (e.g., see schemas HashAlgo
and HashCode above), which in Java comes from the int Object.hashCode()method.
As the retrieve relation relies on the interface refinement relating file identifiers (fid?) and object instances (oid?), we
delay its presentation until after the next subsection, where this relationship is presented.
5.3. File identifier refinement to object instance
Before giving the refinement retrieve, our next step is to refine the abstract FID given set into a more specific index
for the file store, which in our case will be hash codes from the OID given set. Although they are both given sets at the
specification level, at the level of implementation, OIDs are related to the actual memory address all Java object instances
have, whereas FIDs are related to some storage scheme like UNIX inodes. Thus, these two (here abstractly defined) given
sets are clearly distinct in both nature and structure. So, we assume there will be some data type structure which adds the
necessary information for establishing this relationship between them,
[STRUCTURE]
provided at least one of such structures exists (i.e., we always have an existential witness for STRUCTURE).
STRUCT : P1 STRUCTURE
as the theorem below guarantees.
theorem lExistsStruct
∃ s : STRUCT • true.
This important, yet at first concealed detail, is another beneficial outcome from the mechanisation effort: without it the
refinement proof fails whenever we need to establish the link between FID andOID becausewe cannot provide a STRUCTURE
linking them. At last, we define an injection relating (abstract) file identifiers (FID) to (concrete) object instances (OID)
through the given structure (STRUCT ) information.
relIDS0 : FID× STRUCT  OID
Since this relationship (relIDS0) is a total injection, provided an object instance o ∈ OID, we can always retrieve the file
identifier and corresponding structure it corresponds to. That is, the following conjecture can be proved as a theorem
∀ o : OID •
∃ f : FID; s : STRUCT • relIDS0 (f , s) = o.
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Once again, through refuted mechanisations, or failed refinement proofs, we found out that this relationship is not quite as
accurate as we want: it would still allow varied STRUCT representations for the same FID.
e.g., (fid1, struct1) 7→ oid1,
(fid1, struct2) 7→ oid2
Thus, we redefined it as
relIDS : FID (STRUCT × OID)
where we would like to prove the following as a theorem
∀ o : OID; s : STRUCT •
∃ f : FID • relIDS f = (s, o)
The remaining trouble with this definition is that relIDS is still a little weak. Although we can provide a s ∈ STRUCT witness
having an object instance o ∈ OID because STRUCT is non-empty, it would not serve the general case becausewe do not have
enough information to say that this is the s ∈ STRUCT we are looking for. Therefore, we reached the nub of our interface
retrieve: we need to establish that we can find the s linking both f and o.
5.4. Retrieve relation(s)
As the (4) operations have different interfaces, usual forward simulation rules [37, Ch. 16–17] are not enough. Instead,
we need the extended interface refinement rules provided in [6]. For interface refinement, we need to specify three retrieve
relations: one for the state components (R), one for the inputs (RIn), and one for the outputs (ROut).
The retrieve relation for the state components establishes that themap size is related to the abstract file-store cardinality,
and similarly, themaximumnumber of files it can have is set to balancing capacity factors within the HashMap, as happened




MaxNoFiles = capacity ∗ loadfactor
∀ i : N | i ∈ dom hm •
∀ fin : FID | fin ∈ dom fs •
(relIDS fin).2 ∈ dom (ran (hm i)) ∧
fs fin = ran (hm i) (relIDS fin).2
We also need to define how (FID× STRUCT ) pairs from the file store (fs) are related to the object instances (OID) within the
HashMap entries. That is, for all indexes i in hm, and for all known file identifiers (fin ∈ dom fs): (i) the object instance it is
related to through ( (relIDS fin).2) must also be known within the map; and (ii) the associated files are the same.
The missing property we would like for relIDS mentioned above is added here in the interface retrieve RIn given next. It
includes the input variables from the abstract and concrete specification that are being refined, and it is used in the extended
forward simulation rules for interface refinement.
RIn
fid? : FID; oid? : OID
∀ fid : FID; oid : OID •
∃ s : STRUCT • relIDS fid = (s, oid)
∃ oin : OID • oin 6= oid?
The retrieve relation adds the fact that we can always find the s ∈ STRUCT such that relIDS relates the corresponding abstract
and concrete operations for any given fid ∈ FID and oid ∈ OID. We also require that we know at least a different object
identifier from the one input in order to discharge the correctness proof for the concrete RemoveFile operation. From R′ and
the (relIDS fin).2 associated with fin through relIDS, we need to show that
(relIDS fin).2 ∈ dom (fm \ ({ oid? } C fm)) ∧
fm (relIDS fin).2 = (fm \ ({ oid? } C fm)) (relIDS fin).2wherefm = ran (hm i), i ∈ dom hm.
That is, when the general input fin ∈ dom fs from R is different from the fid? input (fid? 6= fin) because we are removing
fid? from fs via { fid? } −C fs, we need to show that (relIDS f ).2 is within the right projection in the map, despite the fact that
it is different from oid?. For that reason, we need to have at least two different OID, as the second invariant in RIn gives. This
way, we can associate (relIDS fin).2 as such OID different from oid? with the simplest predicate possible.
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With this relationship established through RIn, we can now easily prove how each input relates to each other through
relIDS.
theorem frule rInterfaceRetrieveRelIDSInput
∀ RIn • oid? = (relIDS fid?).2
Note that this theorem is given as an frule (or forward rule). That means whenever RIn appears on assumptions, the
prover can automatically infer the resulting relationship. The real benefit for such kinds of rules is that we do not need to
expand RIn on the (possibly already long) list of hypotheses. This leads tomore optimal proof scripts: proofs run faster; proof
scripts become less susceptible to changes due to modification on the specification; a smaller list of hypothesis on a goal
allows one to concentrate on those that really matter to finish the proof; and so on.
We also need to provide an interface refinement for outputs, since all map operations (MapOp) return a hash code key
(hck!) from the given object instance (oid?). Fortunately, as the abstract operation has no output, it suffices to say that we
can find some oid, such that its hash code key is generated through algo.
ROut
hck! : Z
∃ oid : OID • hck! = algo oid
And that is trivially true since this is exactly the value of hck!, as defined in HashCode above. Like in the usual forward
simulation rules, outputs are never part of the assumptions and always part of the conclusion. So, ROut only appears close
to R′ in the refinement rules.
The extended forward simulation rules also allow room for specific relationships between the state and input retrieves
on the hypothesis. For instance, the rules for forward applicability and correctness are given as
∀ R; RIn | pre AOp • pre COp
∀ R; RIn; COp | pre AOp •
∃ A′; a! : AO • AOp ∧ R′ ∧ ROut
for all abstract and concrete operations, and abstract outputs of some type (a! ∈ AO). As both R and RIn declarations are in
context, it is possible to define further invariants between their components. Although this is not mentioned explicitly in [6,
Ch. 5], it can be deduced using the schema calculus.
Finally, the complete retrieve that can appear on the assumption is given as the combination of the retrieve for state
components and interface inputs togetherwith an additional invariant between state components and corresponding inputs.
RIntfRef
R; RIn
fid? /∈ dom fs⇒
(∀ j : N | j ∈ dom hm •
(relIDS fid?).2 /∈ dom (ran (hm j)))
It establishes that whenever the file identifier input fid? is not in the file store fs, there cannot be an object instance related
to fid? through relIDS anywhere within the map.
To show how intricate relationships present themselves throughout the refinement proofs, let us elaborate a little on the
reasons for the existential quantifier present inRIn above. The correctness proof forRemoveFilewith the extended refinement
rule is given as
theorem tRemoveFileCorrectness
∀ RIntfRef ; RemoveFile | pre Destroy •
∃ FFS ′ • Destroy ∧ R′ ∧ ROut
The proof script for this theoremhas 120 proof steps and is quite complex. After initial expansion and simplification, six goals
remain, of which five are relatively easy. The last case is on the universal quantifier from the retrieve relation (R) when both
fs′ and hm′ have been updated through Destroy and RemoveFile. At this point four subgoals remain: i = idx, and i 6= idx as
(relIDS fin).2 ∈ dom (p \ ({ oid? } C p)) (a1)
∧
({ fid? } −C fs) fin =
(p \ ({ oid? } C p)) (relIDS fin).2 (b1)
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Table 1
Operations precondition table
InitFS true InitHM true
Create fid? /∈ dom fs ∧ (∀ i : dom hm •
# fs < MaxNoFiles CreateF oid? /∈ dom (ran (hm i))) ∧
size < capacity ∗ loadfactor
Dest. fid? ∈ dom fs Remove oid? ∈ dom (ran (hm idx)) ∧ size > 1
Read fid? ∈ dom fs ReadD oid? ∈ dom (ran (hm idx))
Write fid? ∈ dom fs WriteD oid? ∈ dom (ran (hm idx))
where p = ran (hm i) represents the pairs within the map entry at index i. From the hypothesis, we also know that the file
id (fin) under consideration is not the one input.
¬ fin = fid? ∧ fin ∈ dom fs
That is because we are dealing with the case after removing fid? from fs, for some other FIDwithin fs. The next step is to use
the hypothesis from the universal quantifier in RIn to link fin with some oid. At first, we had only oid? as a candidate. This
choice leads to the following new (contradictory) version of the goals
oid? ∈ dom (p \ ({oid?} C p)) (a2)
∧ p oid? = (p \ ({oid?} C p)) oid? (b2)
That is because if we filter pwith oid? and then remove the result, oid? itself will never be an appropriate candidate to relate
with fin through relIDS. And that is not surprising since we are removing fid? from fs and fin 6= fid?. That is the reason why
we need at least one object instance available that is different from oid? (i.e., OIDmust have at least two elements), hence
the added invariant as the existential quantifier in RIn.
The final retrieve relation may seem somewhat miraculous, but the iterative process of establishing the refinement
through theorem proving has gone through 60 different versions. This demonstrates that the great value mechanisation
adds to the correct understanding of the problem being modelled.
6. Preconditions
The preconditions for both abstract and concrete operations are summarised in Table 1 below. The abstract operations
require the knowledge about file identifiers (fid?) within the file store (fs), whereas a similar property is required for object
instances (oid?) within the HashMap (hm).
The interesting (less obvious) preconditions are on the concrete create file operations. The concrete file creation requires
that the given object instance (oid?) to create an empty file (〈 〉) is not known within the HashMap, and that there is enough
space in the map to add a new pair ((oid?, 〈 〉)). The object instance must be unknown to avoid useless clashes with the
empty file, and it also ensures consistency of map entries within maps themselves (see Entry in Section 4.1). The other
preconditions are relatively simple. They refer to the appropriate identifier being related to the appropriate projection of
either the file store (fs) or the HashMap (hm).
7. Mechanisation issues
Due to the nature of themapping structure using Entry, themapping operations described above have subtle nuances that
only come to light with the interrogatory nature of a theorem proving exercise. It also creates an opportunity for a general
theory to be reused elsewhere, perhaps in the Verified Software Repository. The use of injections to relate (abstract) given
set data types is also quite a useful general technique that is widely applicable. This justified a general theory for injective
entities, also needed by the work with the previous pilot project on Mondex [38]. For instance, both Mondex and POSIX
require a theory for injective overriding, and injective sequence concatenation.
And it does not stop there: both projects generated opportunities for general theories most probably useful elsewhere.
In particular, theories that are also not only amenable for mechanisation, but also highly automated ones. This includes
strategies for calculating preconditions of deeply nested schema inclusions and promotions; a general relationship between
definite description (µ) and theta (θ ) expressions (i.e., an one-point-mu law); the former (µ) is more cryptic, whereas the
latter (θ ) is preferred both for clarity and automation efficiency issues; and so on. Thus, like Polya [26, p. 108], proving a
more general (and powerful) theory is easier, and in our case also more profitable.
Regarding automation levels for POSIX itself, the major show stopper was the lack of lemmas establishing properties for
entries. Once these lemmas were in place, proofs about the concrete operations, such as preconditions and consistency
checks, were discharged quite smoothly. On the other hand, despite being a quite laborious and time-consuming task,
proving suchproperties for Entry exposedmany importantmissing features thatwere added incrementally, as alreadybriefly
mentioned above.
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Table 2
Proof steps by complexity and category; and proof scripts by category
Steps Scripts
Complexity V1 V2 Mechanisation V1 V2
Trivial 642 633 Automation 86 95
Intermediate 465 470 Consistency 37 37
Creative 230 185 Theorems 96 120
Total steps 1337 1288 Total scripts 219 252
Steps Steps
Command V1 V2 Command V1 V2
invoke 176 238 instantiate 87 72
prenex 48 45 prove 95 97
cases 35 37 prove by reduce 78 69
next 51 59 trivial rewrite 3 1
use 107 87 rearrange 100 90
apply 107 144 rewrite 184 177
with 35 25 reduce 90 36
simplify 75 56 equality subst. 46 36
split 20 19
Total V1 1337 V2 1288
7.1. Mechanisation statistics
A metric often used for the complexity of a proof is the number of creative interactions required for its successful
completion, yet this metric can be misleading. A proof with few interactions is rather like a successful attempt at push-
button search: it does not reveal the underlying argument being proved. In Table 2 (left), we summarise some benchmarks
in terms of proof step complexity spread across different proof scripts for varied mechanisation entities that are stated
as conjectures to be proved as theorems. The columns with V1 and V2 represent the numbers for the original version as
presented in [9] and the current version, respectively. We divide (1337/1288) proof steps into three levels of complexity:
(i) trivial steps (48%/49.5%) are those blindly (and repetitively) selected, and they heavily rely on the adequate automation
rules included for Z/Eves; (ii) intermediate steps (34.8%/36.5%) are those requiring some understanding of how Z/Eves
conducts the predicate transformation whilst doing proof, and are often repetitive; and (iii) creative steps (17.2%/14%) are
those requiring domain knowledge, such as instantiation of existential variables in the middle of a proof. From the previous
version, we decreased the total number of proof steps by 49 steps (3.6%), of which most of the reduction occurred on (45)
creative steps. That is mainly due to better mechanisation lemmas, and a direct equation on hm′ in the new definition for
WriteData. That is despite the fact we increased the number of theorems and automation rules provided! This improvement
in the proof scripts is mainly due to a closer scrutiny of the automation lemmas and more experienced usage of the tool at
this second stage.
There are three kinds of conjectures: (i) additional automation rules for extended data types and toolkit definitions,
such as injective functional overriding and injective sequence concatenation for Entry; (ii) axiomatic consistency and
domain checks to ensure partial functions are applied with their domains; and (iii) lemmas and theorems used to structure
precondition and simulation calculations for refinement. Most of the additional automation rules arise from automating the
typechecking of extended types and operations over such complex types like Entry, which leaves room for generalisation
and reuse, as discussed in Section 7. Among the 52 Z paragraphs comprising axiomatic definitions, given sets, abbreviations,
and schemas, we defined 252 conjectures (and companion proof scripts), as summarised in Table 2 (right). Finally, Table 2
(bottom) breaks down the proof steps per Z/Eves proof command that we used.
8. Conclusions
In this work, we successfully mechanised an abstract POSIX-like file-store specification [22] using the Z/Eves theorem
prover [30,23,31]. We also provided a concrete implementation based on Java HashMaps that is lifted from JML
annotations [1]. These annotations are pre and postconditions, as well as class and loop invariants. From these two data
types, we proved a forward simulation showing that the HashMap implementation refines the abstract file store.
In the quest to formally specify a POSIX file store, we divided the work suggested in [16] following an orthogonal
architecture provided in [5] that enables separation and later combination of concerns, such as functional requirements,
fault-tolerant imperatives, and various hardware devices. This is crucially important in order to allow collaborative work
among scientists with different interests and backgrounds to collaborate in completing the challenge.
In this paper, we tackle part of the functional requirements for a subset of APIs relevant to the challenge, and prove
a refinement towards a concrete data structure that is amenable for prototyping. In this process, we came across an
opportunity to generalise properties proved for injective entities so that work in other formalisms and corresponding tools
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could benefit. In fact, we have actually reused some of these general findings from a previous work in another pilot project
on smart-cards [38]. This is in accordance with the Verified Software Repository providing a harbour to verified designs and
significant verification experiments.
Our efforts are aimed at a particular user (NASA’s JPL), hence we concentrate on an initial small subset of functionality
of their interest. But the work can be considerably more general than this, because we follow Intel’s architecture mentioned
above [5], hencewehave amodular project development strategy. The results of thiswork are collected and available on-line
at the VSR repository at SourceForge [7].
Collaboration and exploitation. The choice of Java HashMap is quite beneficial. It not only provides an efficient (and well-
known) implementation for the abstract file store that is amenable for prototyping, but it also serves as a new Z (HashMap)
data type that can be useful for different modelling purposes, as further explained in [19]. Yet another indirect use could be
to validate some JML properties in a theorem prover from the lifted JML description of HashMaps. And this idea has already
been applied for Java sets [14]. As the collaboration with other scientists might not progress using Z, it is important that we
find a way of trading assertions between different tools and techniques. This is achieved in two levels: (i) syntactic, with
the aid of translators, say from Z to/from B [33] and JML; and (ii) semantic, with the aid of a common theoretical ground to
trade proved theorems among different logics. Furthermore, as a result of using Z/Eves so effectively for both Mondex and
POSIX projects, we are in liaison to make Z/Eves an open source within VSR.
Future work. Within the UNIX specification from [22], there are still two other parts to be developed related to links and
directories. In [4], advances are being made towards flash-memory hardware integration. And following the architecture
from [5], there are many open issues to be addressed, such as different hardware devices, fault-tolerant aspects, and further
functionality aspects likemultithreading and real-time, networking, or file permissions and encryption. One could also refine
the concrete HashMap implementation down to a more sequential program, which can be used to compare with the JML
specifications. Like the knight Perceval from Camelot, we ought to persevere in the quest for the Verified Software Initiative.
References
[1] L. Burdy, et al., An overview of JML tools and applications, in: 8th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems, FMICS,
ENTCS, University of Nijmegen, Elsevier, March 2003, pp. 73–89.
[2] L. Burdy, et al., Java applet correctness: A developer-oriented approach, in: Proceedings of Formal Methods Europe, Pisa, in: LNCS, vol. 2805, Springer,
2003, pp. 422–439. Formal Methods Europe.
[3] Joshua Bloch, Effective Java Programming Language Guide, 1st ed., Prentice Hall, 2001.
[4] Andrew Butterfield, Jim Woodcock, Formalising flash memory: First steps, in: 12th ICECCS, Auckland, New Zealand, IEEE, July 2007, pp. 251–260.
[5] Intel Corporation, Intel r© Flash File System Core Reference Guide, version 1, Technical Report 304436001, Intel Corporation, October 2004.
[6] David Cooper, Susan Stepney, Jim Woodcock, Derivation of Z refinement proof rules: Forwards and backwards rules incorporating input/output
refinement, Technical Report YCS-2002-347, University of York, 2002.
[7] Leo Freitas, et al., Verified Software Repository @ SourceForge. http://vsr.sourceforge.net, 2006.
[8] Leo Freitas, et al., Workshop on the vsr grand challenge: POSIX file stores, Dublin, 2006.
[9] Leo Freitas, Zheng Fu, Jim Woodcock, POSIX file store in Z/Eves: An experiment in the verified software repository, in: 12th ICECCS, Auckland, New
Zealand, IEEE, July 2007, pp. 3–12.
[10] Fred Barnes, et al., RMoX: A raw-metal occam experiment, in: Communicating Process Architectures, IOS Press, 2003, pp. 269–288.
[11] Zheng Fu, A refinement of the UNIX filing system using Z/Eves, Master’s Thesis, University of York, October 2006.
[12] Tony Hoare, The verifying compiler software grand challenge, Journal of ACM 50 (1) (2003) 63–69.
[13] M. Huisman, Reasoning about Java programs in higher-order logic using PVS and Isabelle, Ph.D. Thesis, Universiteit Nijmegen, 2001.
[14] M. Huisman, Verification of Java’s abstractcollection class: A case study, in: Proceedings of 6th Conference on Mathematics of Program Construction,
in: LNCS, vol. 2386, Springer, 2002, pp. 175–194.
[15] IEEE POSIXWorking Group, Interface requirements for realtime distributed systems communication, Technical Report IEEE P1003.21, IEEE, July 1995.
[16] Rajeev Joshi, Gerard J. Holzmann, A mini-challenge: Build a verifiable filesystem, in: Verified Software: Theories, Tools, Experiments (VSTTE), Zurich,
Switzerland, 2005. IFIP Working Conference.
[17] Andrew Josey (Ed.) The Single UNIX Specification Version 3, Open Group, 2004. ISBN: 193162447X.
[18] Imre Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 0521290384, 2005.
[19] Leo Freitas, JimWoodcock, Proving theorems about JML classes, in: Cliff Jones, et al. (Eds.), FormalMethods andHybrid Real-Time Systems: (Festschrift)
Essays in Honour of Dines Bjorner and Zhou ChaoChen on the Occasion of their 70th Birthdays, in: LNCS, vol. 4700, Springer, 2007, pp. 255–279.
[20] Seug-Ho Lim, Chul Lee, Kyu Ho Park, Hashing directory scheme for NAND flash file system, in: 9th IEEE International Conference on Advanced
Communication Technology, in: Advanced Communication Technology, vol. 1, IEEE, 2007, pp. 273–276, doi:10.1109/ICACT.2007.358354.
[21] Seug-Ho Lim, Kyu Ho Park, An efficient nand flash file system for flash memory storage, IEEE Transactions on Computers 55 (7) (2006) 906–912.
[22] Carroll Morgan, Bernard Sufrin, Specification of the UNIX filing system, in: Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. SE-10, IEEE, 1984, pp. 128–142.
[23] Irwin Meisels, Mark Saaltink, Z/Eves 1.5 Reference Manual, ORA Canada, September 1997. TR-97-5493-03d.
[24] Open Group Technical Standard, Protocols for Interworking: XNFS, Version 3W, Technical Report C702, The Open Group, February 1998. ISBN:
1859121845.
[25] Patrick Place, POSIX 1003.21—Real time distributed systems communication, Technical report, Software Engineering Institute @ Carnegie Mellon
University, August 1995.
[26] G. Polya, How to Solve it: A New Aspect of Mathematical Method, Princeton University Press, 2004.
[27] Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 3rd ed., in: Routledge Classics, ISBN: 0-415-28594-1, 2006.
[28] Bertrand Russell, Recent work in philosophy of mathematics, in: International Monthly, 1901. Reprinted in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays,
Barnes & Noble, 1976, pp. 59–74.
[29] Susan Stepney, et al., An Electronic Purse: Specification, Refinement, and Proof, in: PRG, vol. 126, Oxford University, July 2000.
[30] Mark Saaltink, Z/Eves 2.0 User’s Guide, ORA Canada, 1999. TR-99-5493-06a.
[31] Mark Saaltink, Z/Eves 2.0 Mathematical Toolkit, ORA Canada, October 2003. TR-03-5493-05b.
[32] Hynix Semi Conductor et al., Open nand flash interface (onfi) specification, Technical Report 1.0, ONFI, December 2006.
[33] Steve Schneider, The B-Method—an Introduction, Palgrave, 2002.
[34] J.M. Spivey, The Z Notation: A Reference Manual, Prentice-Hall, 1998.
[35] SRI. Workshop on the verification grand challenge. www.csl.sri.com/users/shankar/VGC05, February 2005.
L. Freitas et al. / Science of Computer Programming 74 (2009) 238–257 257
[36] J.C.P. Woodcock, A.L.C. Cavalcanti, A concurrent language for refinement, in: A. Butterfield, C. Pahl, (Eds.), IWFM’01: 5th Irish Workshop in Formal
Methods, BCS Electronic Workshops in Computing, Dublin, Ireland, July 2001.
[37] JimWoodcock, Jim Davies, Using Z: Specification, Refinement, and Proof, Prentice-Hall, 1996.
[38] JimWoodcock, Leo Freitas, Z/Eves and the Mondex electronic purse, in: 3rd ICTAC, in: LNCS, vol. 4281, Springer, 2006, pp. 15–34.
[39] YAFFS Direct Interface (YDI) User’s Guide. www.aleph1.co.uk/node/349, July 2006.
[40] Fu Zheng, Leo Freitas, Jim Woodcock, Interface refinement of the unix filing system using Z/Eves, Technical Report CRG-13, University of York.
http://www.cs.york.ac.uk/circus/mc/reports/CRG-13.pdf, 2007.
